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A Remedy for the Victims of Pollution
Permit Markets
The current federal scheme for controlling air pollution involves a com-
prehensive regulatory program that imposes uniform, site-specific emis-
sion limitations. Economists have criticized this system as severely ineffi-
cient and have offered a number of alternatives, including the use of
marketable pollution permits.
This Note points out that pollution markets can produce high localized
pollution concentrations, thereby creating severe inequities for a few citi-
zens. Because present common-law remedies may be inadequate to com-
pensate these victims and because compensation by an individual polluter
does not equitably involve all of the parties benefiting from a localized
"hot spot," this Note argues that the government should compensate vic-
tims. Takings doctrine provides support for the view that the government
has "taken" property when it adopts a market approach resulting in hot
spots. Furthermore, takings analysis provides the basis for a statutory
cause of action against the government to remedy the injuries caused by
the market. The Note concludes that such a statute, embodying precise
standards of liability and creating an administrative tribunal to hear
claims, should be adopted at the federal level.'
I. The Clean Air Act and National Ambient Air Quality Standards
The 1970 amendments to the Clean Air Act' enacted a comprehensive
scheme for regulating emissions from industrial facilities. The National
Ambient Air Quality Standards (NAAQS)3 form the centerpiece of the
program. Congress authorized the Administrator of the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to establish primary and secondary NAAQS,
setting ceiling ambient concentrations for each pollutant for which the Ad-
ministrator has issued "air quality criteria."4 The primary standard must
1. Lying behind this Note is the broader question whether Congress should create a market at all.
This Note does not address that problem directly, preferring instead to provide a remedial framework
in case Congress does act. Any debate over the issue would invoke the ideals of equity on the one hand
and efficiency on the other. This Note assumes the establishment of a market in pollution permits and
seeks to incorporate the ideals of both efficiency and equity.
2. Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(Supp. V 1981)).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. V 1981).
4. Id. § 7409(a)(1)(A). EPA has issued criteria documents for sulfur dioxide, carbon monoxide,




protect health;5 the secondary standard must protect public welfare.6 Once
NAAQS are adopted, the states are required to develop comprehensive
State Implementation Plans (SIPs), including site-specific emission limita-
tions, 7 to ensure compliance with the ambient standards within each Air
Quality Control Region (AQCR).8
Congress intended the NAAQS to be geographically uniform, applica-
ble in every part of each state,9 and the EPA has required compliance at
every measurement site within a region.10 This strict adherence to uni-
formity reflects an equitable principle in the Act-the desire to "protect
the health of persons" regardless of their location, wealth, or susceptibility
to disease."
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981). The primary standard for each "criteria" pollutant
must specify the ceiling on permissible concentration "requisite to protect the public health" and
"allowing an adequate margin of safety." Id.
6. Id. § 7409(b)(2). The secondary standard must limit concentration to the level necessary "to
protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects .... " Id. Adverse effects on
welfare include damage to soil, water, vegetation, man-made materials, wildlife, visibility, climate, and
economic values. See S. REP. NO. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1970); A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE,
POLLUTION, PRICES, AND PUBLIC POLICY 52 (1975); Krier, The Irrational National Air Quality Stan-
dards: Macro- and Micro-Mistakes, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 323, 325 (1974).
7. The standards for new sources must incorporate specific federal requirements. See 42 U.S.C. §
7411 (Supp. V 1981) (establishing new source performance standards). The state itself may set re-
quirements for old sources. In both cases, however, the SIP requirements must ensure compliance
with NAAQS.
8. Id. § 7410(a). The states must achieve primary standards within three years of promulgation
and must achieve secondary standards within a "reasonable time." Id. § 7410(a)(2)(A). The Adminis-
trator may grant a two-year extension of the deadline for attainment of primary standards if the
original deadline is impractical. Id. § 7410(e)(1). In any event, however, the Act required attainment
of primary NAAQS by 1977. R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 342 (2d
ed. 1978).
9. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7407(a), 7410(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981); R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 8,
at 341, 364; Krier, supra note 6, at 324-25.
10. See 40 C.F.R. § 50 (1983); see also United States Steel Corp. v. EPA, 605 F.2d 283, 291-94
(7th Cir. 1979) (non-attainment designation because NAAQS exceeded at one monitoring site), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1035 (1980). The EPA has proposed that measurement sites be located close to one
another in the vicinity of an emission source. See OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARD
RESEARCH, GUIDELINES ON AIR QUALITY MODELS: PROPOSED REVISION 37-38 (1980). Such tight
clusters of receptors help to ensure compliance with ambient standards in the areas immediately sur-
rounding emission sources.
11. See S. REP. NO. 1196, supra note 6, at 10 ("In requiring that national ambient air quality
standards be established at a level necessary to protect the health of persons, . . . the Committee
emphasizes that included among those persons. . . are particularly sensitive citizens such as bronchi-
al asthmatics and emphysematics who in the normal course of daily activity are exposed to the ambi-
ent environment."); Krier, supra note 6, at 329.
In line with the commitment to uniform health, technological infeasibility and high cost would not
be considered in setting NAAQS and would not justify a polluter's failure to meet the standards. See
Lead Indus. Ass'n v. EPA, 647 F.2d 1130, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1042 (1980);
S. REP. NO. 1196, supra note 6, at 2, 3 (1970).
A second principle informing the Act is the congressional intent to involve the public in all phases
of the regulatory process. The Senate Public Works Committee Report called the committee's concern
to preserve public participation a "unique feature of the Air Quality Act of 1967." S. REP. NO. 1196,
supra note 6, at 3; see also Hearings on S. 3229, S. 3466, S. 3546 Before the Subcomm. on Air and
Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 91st Cong., 2d Ses. 620, 621 (1970) (state-
ment of Rep. Mikva) (standard-setting requires public policy decisions in which citizens should be
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II. Market Alternatives to Uniform Controls
Several economists, however, have criticized the inefficiency of uniform
controls.1" The costs to polluters of achieving a given pollution level and,
conversely, the costs to society if that level is exceeded, will vary greatly
among regions.1" Moreover, the marginal costs of controlling emissions
will vary among different industrial plants.1 4 Thus, a uniform standard is
likely to result in an inefficient allocation of pollution controls. In addi-
tion, prescriptive regulations offer no incentives for reduction of emissions
below the level mandated by NAAQS. 1 5
Many theorists have suggested pricing mechanisms to overcome the in-
efficiencies of prescriptive regulation. 8 The proposals include governmen-
tal subsidies for pollution reduction,17 "effluent charges"18 (levies on each
increment of pollution), and markets in pollution rights. 9 Marketable
involved) [hereinafter cited as Hearings]. The 1970 Act provides for written comments at the stan-
dard-setting stage and public hearings at the implementation stage. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a)(1)(B),
7410(a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
12. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, S. ROSE-ACKERMAN, J. SAWYER & D. HENDERSON, THE UNCER-
TAIN SEARCH FOR ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY 228-29 (1974) (uniform controls fail to "discriminate
between high- and low-cost treatment possibilities") [hereinafter cited as UNCERTAIN SEARCH]; W.
BAUMOL & W. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 238 (1979)
(pollution control more costly under uniform standards than under other systems); W. BAXTER, PEO-
PLE OR PENGUINS: THE CASE FOR OPTIMAL POLLUTION 63-68 (1974) (same); Krier, supra note 6, at
324-30 (NAAQS fail to take account of regional differences); Zerbe, Optimal Environmental Juris-
dictions, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 193, 212-13, 215-16 (1974) (uniform controls contrast with diversity in
society).
13. The costs of achieving a given standard will depend on initial pollution levels, population,
geographical features, and atmospheric conditions. The costs to society of greater air pollution (includ-
ing aesthetic and health costs) will differ, depending on the uses of land and the attitudes of people in
different areas. See Krier, supra note 6, at 327; c. J. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES 50,
51-52 (1968) (varying costs of given levels of pollution).
14. See W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 12, at 338-40; del Calvo y Gonzalez, Markets in
Air Problems and Prospects of Controlled Trading, 5 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 377, 386 (1981);
Tietenberg, The Design of Property Rights of Air-Pollution Control, 22 PUB. POL'Y 275, 279 (1974).
15. See W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 12, at 236-37.
16. See UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 12, at 260-81; J. DALES, supra note 13, at 88-97. The
EPA could overcome the inefficiencies of prescriptive regulation by setting pollution controls at the
optimal level, given the marginal abatement costs of each polluter and the available alternatives. Such
an efficient prescription of controls, however, would require a huge body of accurate information. The
administrative costs of acquiring that information would be astronomical, and the chance of error and
the cost of such error would be high.
17. Cf A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 6, at 34-38 (recognizing weaknesses in subsidy
approach); J. DALES, supra note 13, at 81 (same). Subsidies tend to be linked to the use of particular
control technologies, thereby limiting flexibility. See A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 6, at 37.
In addition, the government must have sufficient information to match subsidy payments to the margi-
nal cost of reductions. The information costs could again be very high. See J. DALES, supra note 13, at
87.
18. See W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 12, at 246-50, 255-67; A. KNEESE & B. BOWER,
MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS 97-101, 131-72 (1973). But
see Rose-Ackerman, Effluent Charges: A Critique, 6 CANADIAN J. ECON. 512 (1973) (enumerating
potential inefficiencies in effluent charge scheme).
19. UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 12, at 260-81; W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 12, at
250-53; J. DALES, supra note 13, at 93-97; Hahn & Noll, Designing a Market for Tradable Emis-
sions Permits, in REFORM OF ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION 119, 120-23 (W. Magat ed. 1982).
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rights offer several advantages over subsidies and effluent charges; 2° in
addition, recent changes in federal policy indicate a willingness to experi-
ment with markets in emission rights.
2 1
The structure of a pollution market is fairly simple.22 At the outset, the
government would define a market region and determine the overall level
of emissions for each pollutant within that region. It would then distribute
a limited number of permits for each pollutant,23 each permit representing
20. See supra note 17 (relative disadvantages of subsidies). Baumol and Oates note that permit
markets are superior to effluent charges, because markets (1) are invulnerable to inflation, (2) are
invulnerable to increases in population and industrial activity, (3) allow different numbers of permits
in different geographical regions, and (4) insure a certain level of emissions. W. BAUMOL & W.
OATES, supra note 12, at 251-52. Permit markets avoid the danger of excess pollution that result if
effluent charges are set too low. See UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 12, at 262-67.
21. Congress and the EPA have begun to experiment with limited markets, permitting the trading
of "emission offsets" in areas that have not yet attained NAAQS. See Air Quality Standards Interpre-
tative Ruling, 41 Fed. Reg. 55,524 (1976), revised at 44 Fed. Reg. 3274 (1979) (codified at 40 C.F.R.
§ 51, app. S (1983)) [hereinafter cited as EPA Ruling]; 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7503 (Supp. V 1981).
Responding to a concern that major new stationary sources or major modification of existing sources
would not be permitted in non-attainment areas, EPA announced that it would allow new construc-
tion or modification only if the overall level of emissions in the AQCR were decreased. See EPA
Ruling, supra, 41 Fed. Reg. at 55,529; Rosenberg & Friedman, Air Quality and Industrial Growth:
The Location of New Industrial Sources of Pollution in Non-Attainment Areas, 11 NAT. RESOURCES
LAW. 523, 534-35 (1978); Note, Emission-Offset Banking: Accommodating Industrial Growth with
Air Quality Standards, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 937, 940-41 (1980). In other words, new sources must
obtain offsetting decreases in emissions from existing sources in the area, and the decreases must more
than offset anticipated emissions by the new facility. 40 C.F.R. § 50 app. S, IV (A), condition 4
(1983) ("The emission offsets will provide a positive net air quality benefit in the affected
area . . ").
The EPA policy made it possible for a new firm to purchase "offsets" from existing firms. See R.
LIROFF, supra note 4, at 17-19, 33; Note, supra, at 937. Moreover, in 1979, EPA allowed existing
plants to reduce emissions unilaterally and bank those offsets until a buyer could be found in the
future. See 44 Fed. Reg. 3274, 3280 (1979); Comment, Who Owns the Air? The Emission Offset
Concept and Its Implications, 9 ENVTL. L. 575, 594-95 (1979).
However, to date there are only three regional emissions banks, and, in general, the EPA approach
imposes severe restrictions on trading. The new source must meet the "lowest achievable emission
rate"; the applicant must certify that all existing major sources owned by the applicant in the AQCR
are in compliance with SIP limitations; the trade must achieve "reasonable progress" toward attain-
ment of NAAQS; and the offsets must provide a net air quality benefit in the affected area. 40 C.F.R.
§ 50, App. S, IV (A) (1983). For these and other reasons, an active market has not developed under
the EPA regulations. See del Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 401.
In 1977, Congress enacted the substance of the "emission offset" policy in the non-attainment pro-
visions of the Clean Air Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7501-7503 (Supp. V 1981). The only significant departure
from the EPA approach is the absence of an explicit requirement that there be a "net air quality
benefit" in the immediate vicinity. The non-attainment provisions merely require reasonable further
progress towards the attainment of NAAQS. Id. § 7503.
Two bills introduced in Congress in 1983, S. 145, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), and H.R. 132, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), would employ emission offsets as tools to control the interstate transport of
sulfur oxides.
22. Cf W. BAUMOL & NV. OATES, supra note 12, at 251-53 (giving general description of water
pollution market); J. DALES, supra note 13, at 93-98 (same).
23. The government could distribute permits in one of several ways. For example, it could hold
an auction, selling permits to the highest bidders. See, e.g., UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 12, at
272-73; J. DALES, supra note 13, at 93-94.
Alternatively, the government could distribute permits according to the old SIP requirements. If the
overall level of emissions established for the market equaled those permitted by the SIP, the govern-
ment could simply create permits granting each emitter the same level of pollution he was previously
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the right to emit a particular amount of pollution for a specific period of
time. The sum of the permits for each pollutant would equal the total
amount of emissions of the pollutant allowable within the market region.
Polluters in the region would be allowed to buy or sell permits.
The market would allow polluters themselves to determine the most
economical mix of pollution controls within a geographical region. Indus-
tries with relatively high marginal abatement costs would buy emission
permits, until the marginal cost of abating one unit of pollution equalled
the price of a permit.24 The price of permits would fluctuate with the
market, ultimately reaching an equilibrium in which the marginal abate-
ment cost of every firm was the same and equal to the price of a pollution
right. Once in place, the market system would theoretically minimize the
total cost to emitters of achieving a given level of air quality.2" Moreover,
since a firm could sell any unused permits, it would have an incentive to
develop and incorporate more effective methods of reducing emissions.
III. The Hot Spot
Although a market in pollution rights, once established, would rep-
resent an efficient system in terms of industry's marginal costs of control,
such a market would result in localized concentrations of pollution above
the average, pre-market level. If permits were issued for a pollutant that
settled out close to its source, producing local effects,2" and if one or more
assigned. Even if overall emissions under the market were different from those under the SIP, the
government could still look to the SIP requirements for guidance, for example, in distributing permits
pro rata according to the former requirements.
Finally, the government could use other criteria (for example, the relative "importance" of different
industries as judged by number of employees hired) to distribute permits on a case-by-case basis. Such
an approach, however, would require complex and costly governmental fact-finding and
decisionmaking.
24. See UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra note 12, at 261. Alternatively, a polluter with low marginal
abatement costs would reduce emissions and sell pollution rights until its abatement costs equaled the
cost of a permit. A firm might even realize that no level of production would be as lucrative as the sale
of its pollution rights and other assets.
25. Id. But see W. BAUMOL & W. OATES, supra note 12, at 252-53 (arguing that although this
distribution of controls is cost-effective for a given quantity of total emissions, that quantity may not
be ideal because resources for cleaning the air are diverted from other important societal programs).
The efficiency of the market may also be impaired by high start-up and transaction costs. Imple-
menting the new program would produce initial costs for both government and businesses. The gov-
ernment would have to develop a system for issuing permits and new enforcement mechanisms (able
to keep track of the shifting patterns of permit ownership). Businesses would have to develop new
control strategies (calculating the marginal costs of buying and selling permits) and new methods for
marketing permits.
Even after the system was in place, transaction costs would lessen the efficiencies of the market.
The government would have to oversee and record trades, and enforce the changing pollution require-
ments; and businessmen would have to continue to monitor the market and the availability of buyers
and sellers.
26. See Note, Technology-Based Emission and Effluent Standards and the Achievement of Ambi-
ent Environmental Objectives, 91 YALE L.J. 792, 810 (1982) (discussing distinction between site-
specific "local" pollutants and long-range "global" pollutants).
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firms within a locality purchased a large number of permits, then local
concentrations might far exceed the level prescribed by the former air
quality standards. Such a situation would occur, for example, if a large
emissions source had been required under a SIP to adopt abatement meth-
ods with higher marginal costs than other plants."' Once a market devel-
oped, the firm would buy large numbers of pollution permits rather than
pay the higher costs of abatement.28 If the firm's SIP restrictions had been
tailored to allow the highest possible local concentrations without violating
NAAQS, the purchase of additional permits would create concentrations
in excess of NAAQS in the vicinity of the plant.29
The likelihood of such a geographical "hot-spot" increases with the size
of the market region;80 larger regions will contain more potential emission
traders and greater disparity between marginal costs. In addition, a larger
market region increases the likelihood that the seller and buyer of pollu-
tion rights are not in the same immediate vicinity and that emission reduc-
tions by the seller do not cancel out emission increases by the purchaser.31
The possibility of a hot spot reflects an inherent inequity in the market
system, for a few citizens would suffer for the benefit of society as a
whole. The overall market region would benefit from improved air quali-
ty32 and lower control costs that would be reflected in consumer prices. 3
Persons living near the hot-spot polluter, however, would be burdened by
27. See Hahn & Noll, supra note 19, at 129 (noting relatively high marginal costs of abatement
for utilities under present policies).
28. Id.
29. Hot spots might likewise result if governmental regulations specifically designated certain high
concentration regions. For example, if the government ostensibly relaxed NAAQS across the board
but left strict limitations in the great majority of regions under the Prevention of Significant Deterio-
ration (PSD) program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (Supp. V 1981), then localized concentrations might
occur in the non-PSD regions. The remedy for market hot spots proposed in this Note, see infra pp.
1032-40, would apply equally well to hot spots resulting from non-uniform standards.
30. See Hahn & Noll, supra note 19, at 122. Prevailing winds and geographical features (taken
into account in the current regulatory scheme but ignored in a market that counts only total emis-
sions) might also intensify concentrations. Moreover, trades to plants with lower smoke stacks would
increase localized pollution levels.
31. California has already developed offset rules, see supra note 21, that may allow hot spots to
develop. In fact, in 1979, the Bay Area Air Quality Management District (BAAQMD) in San Fran-
cisco authorized the Wickland Oil Company to obtain sulfur dioxide and hydrocarbon offsets from a
dry cleaner and from sulfur-burning ships located at some distance from the Company's proposed new
oil receiving facility. See R. LIROFF, supra note 4, at 33. Environmentalists claimed that the trade
would worsen local pollution levels, already in excess of NAAQS. Id. at 33, 53 n.110. The Company
agreed in an administrative settlement to alter the terms of the transaction. Nevertheless, the original
proposal arguably met the requirements of BAAQMD regulations. The District has since altered its
rules to set stricter limitations on the geograpical distance between buyers and sellers of offsets.
32. Regional air quality would improve because much of the market's pollution would be concen-
trated in a limited area. Site-specific pollutants would settle out near the plant, leaving cleaner air for
the rest of the AQCR.
33. As a firm reduced its emission controls costs, the average costs of its products would decline.
Assuming that the firm operated in a competitive market, these savings would be passed on to
consumers.
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pollution levels above the former primary and secondary NAAQS. Such
high concentrations would cause injuries to health, assuming that primary
standards had been accurately based on health effects.34 The higher con-
centrations would also drive down property values, 35 as smoke, odors,
damage to improvements, and anticipated injuries to health interfered
with current uses of the property and rendered the land less desirable.36
A. Barriers to Market Participation
Some economists have argued that the individual could purchase cleaner
air by buying permits on the pollution permit market.3 7 Furthermore,
groups of landowners could theoretically organize to purchase permits. In
practice, however, this strategy is not likely to be effective. The cost of
emission rights could be very high,3" and hot-spot victims might have to
purchase a large number of permits to clean up a neighboring polluter, 9
thus making the overall cost prohibitive.4 In addition, although econo-
mists foresee free entry into the market, local governments might facili-
tate4' and even subsidize42 the purchase of pollution rights by new indus-
34. But c. A. KNEESE & C. SCHULTZE, supra note 6, at 51-52 (doubting whether there are
threshold pollution levels below which health effects do not occur). The authors assume, however, that
injuries to health do increase with pollution exposure. See id. at 16-17.
35. Environmental economists generally assume that, ceteris paribus, as pollution concentration
increases, the value of property decreases. See A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 18, at 136. Local
zoning ordinances could mitigate somewhat the pollution-related diminutions in property values by
ensuring that industrial plants are zoned away from other properties.
36. These injuries would be compounded, because the market would have been instituted in the
wake of a prescriptive system that promised a minimum level of air quality everywhere. See supra p.
1023. The landowner's reliance on that minimum had been reflected in the price he paid for the
property. A subsequent decline in value would injure him directly.
If he had bought property after the market had been instituted but while the pollution level in the
vicinity met the former NAAQS, the price for the property would theoretically reflect the risk of a
future hot spot and therefore would be somewhat lower than under the NAAQS system. The great
uncertainty about where hot spots would occur, however, would minimize this decline in value; and
the subsequent development of a nearby hot spot would still lower property values and result in an
injury not shared by most other citizens.
37. See J. DALES, supra note 13, at 95-98.
38. See Hahn & Noll, supra note 19, at 132.
39. See supra p. 1027.
40. Hot spots are likely to occur in areas of lower-income housing that are located near industrial
zones. The market scheme thus would place inequitable burdens on lower-income residents, who
could not compete in an emissions market.
41. For example, the California Air Resources Board facilitated "emissions offset" trades, see
supra note 31, to spur development. R. LIROFF, supra note 4, at 17-18.
42. See, e.g., id. at 13-17 (Pennsylvania financed offsets as part of incentive package to induce
Volkswagen Corp. to build plant within state); id. at 15-17 (Virginia provided free offsets to en-
courage construction of new oil refinery).
A government might provide such incentives in order to bolster the local economy. The smooth
operation of the market permits industrial growth beyond that possible under command-and-control
regulations. A firm can increase output without violating regulatory standards and at a lower cost
than if it also had to prevent its emissions from increasing. Moreover, new and more efficient firms




tries, thereby weakening the ability of hot-spot victims to retire useful
permits.43
B. Insufficiency of Legal Remedies Against the Polluter
Under the market scheme, hot-spot victims would not necessarily have a
cause of action against the polluter. First, since there would be no viola-
tion of federal standards, the citizens' suit provisions of the Clean Air
Act 4 would not apply. In addition, common law actions might not be
viable. In Milwaukee v. Illinois,5 the United States Supreme Court re-
cently held that the Federal Water Pollution Control Act preempts federal
common law nuisance actions. The Second Circuit noted, in New England
Legal Foundation v. Costle," that the Supreme Court's logic might apply
to the Clean Air Act as well.
Even if common law actions were not preempted, state and federal au-
thorization of a hot spot would have a significant impact on decisions by
local courts. A court may deny recovery for an intentional nuisance if the
conduct is "reasonable. ' 47 State and federal regulations authorizing the
defendant's pollution level would have a strong bearing on the determina-
tion of reasonableness. 48 Furthermore, in determining reasonableness, the
43. To the extent that landowners cannot participate in the market, they are denied a voice in the
allocation process. A democratic legislature would presumably institute the market. But once the mar-
ket was in place, allocations having great societal consequences would be made by an undemocratic
institution representing only one concern: controlling emissions at the lowest cost.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. V 1981) (creating cause of action by citizen against polluter for
violation of Clean Air Act).
45. 451 U.S. 304 (1981).
46. 666 F.2d 30 (2d Cir. 1981). The court in New England Legal Foundation dismissed a nui-
sance action on the ground that the EPA specifically authorized the defendant's use of high sulfur
fuels. The court stated:
Congress has indicated that regulation may be better achieved through a comprehensive statu-
tory approach than through ad hoc common law remedies. The federal courts of course must
bow to that expression of congressional intent. To proceed otherwise by fashioning federal
equitable remedies to proscribe the very conduct that the EPA, acting in its regulatory capacity
pursuant to its statutory mandate, has specifically approved ...would be both counter-
productive and beyond the proper scope of the judicial function.
Id. at 33 (citations omitted); accord Connecticut v. Long Island Lighting Co., 535 F. Supp. 546, 551
(E.D.N.Y. 1982) (EPA approval of fuel sulfur content variance precluded nuisance suit).
47. See Mowrer v. Ashland Oil & Ref. Co., 518 F.2d 659, 661 (7th Cir. 1975); Desruisseau v.
Isley, 27 Ariz. App. 257, 260-61, 553 P.2d 1242, 1245-46 (1976); City of Chicago v. Commonwealth
Edison Co., 24 11. App. 3d 624, 631-32, 321 N.E.2d 412, 418 (1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 826 (1979); see also Florida E. Coast Properties v. Metropolitan Dade County, 572 F.2d
1108, 1112 (5th Cir.) (gravity of harm to plaintiff weighed against utility of defendant's conduct),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 894 (1978).
48. See City of Chicago v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 624, 632-33, 321 N.E.2d
412, 419 (1974) (federal pollution requirements influence court's reasonableness determination); see
also Boccardo v. United States, 341 F. Supp. 858, 865 (N.D. Cal. 1972) (statutory requirements
affect determination of reasonableness where "'legislature contemplated the doing of the very act
which occasions the injury' ") (quoting Hassell v. City of San Francisco, 11 Cal. 2d 168, 171, 78 P.2d
1021, 1023 (1938)); Desruisseau v. Isley, 27 Ariz. App. 257, 261, 553 P.2d 1242, 1246 (1976) (com-
pliance with zoning ordinance a "persuasive factor in determining the reasonableness of the activity").
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court may weigh the burden to plaintiff against the utility of defendant's
conduct. 49 In this case, benefits to society would include not only defend-
ant's production but also the lower cost of pollution abatement and the
research incentives created by the market."0
Practical barriers would also hinder nuisance suits. If several emission
sources contributed to a localized concentration of pollution, a plaintiff
might have difficulty in tying that condition to a particular defendant.
51
Furthermore, the plaintiff might be unable to prove that the injury to
health or property value resulted from air pollution.52 Finally, the opera-
tion of a market might pose devilish proximate cause problems: Did the
firm that sold emission rights to defendant-polluter cause the plaintiff's
injury? What about a governmental agency that encouraged and actively
supported the trade? 53 What about investment brokers and other partici-
pants in the market?
A final practical difficulty associated with both bringing suit and at-
tempting to prevent hot spots by buying and retiring permits is the high
cost of acting alone or organizing a class action. 54 Under the current pre-
scriptive air pollution control scheme, the government bears the cost of
preventing high local concentrations by enforcing SIP limitations.55 In a
market system, the individual would have to bear the cost of abating local
concentrations, either through market activity or litigation. Environmental
49. See Florida E. Coast Properties v. Metropolitan Dade County, 572 F.2d 1108, 1112 (5th Cir.
1978); Little Joseph Realty v. Town of Babylon, 41 N.Y.2d 738, 744-45, 363 N.E.2d 1163, 1168,
395 N.Y.S.2d 428, 433 (1977); Jewett v. Dearborn Enters., 281 Or. 469, 478-79, 575 P.2d 164, 169
(1978); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1979); Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit:
Traditional Doctrines and Evolving Theories to Control Pollution, 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1085, 1110
(1970); Comment, State Air Pollution Control Legislation, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 712, 717
(1968).
50. See supra pp. 1024-26.
51. See Comment, State Air Pollution Control Legislation, supra note 49, at 717; Hearings, supra
note 11, at 836, 837-38 (statement of Bernard S. Cohen); see also Maas v. Perkins, 42 Wash. 2d 38,
43, 253 P.2d 427, 430 (1953) (requiring that injury be traceable to each defendant); O'Neal v. South-
ern Carbon Co., 216 La. 96, 101-02, 43 So. 2d 230, 232 (1949) (same). But see infra note 62 (meth-
ods of easing proof of causation).
52. See Hearings, supra note 11, at 836 (statement of James W. Jeans). Proving causation of
injuries to health may be particularly difficult, for many diseases are believed to be the result of
multiple causes. See, e.g., Industrial Union v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 633-34 (1980)
(plurality opinion) (Benzene); Note, Tort Actions for Cancer: Deterrence, Compensation, and Envi-
ronmental Carcinogenesis, 90 YALE L.J. 840, 848, 854 (1981). Furthermore, scientists are uncertain
about what level of pollution is necessary to cause impairment to health. See Reserve Mining v.
United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1080 (8th Cir. 1974); McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discre-
tion in Administrative Resolution of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and
OSHA, 67 GEo. L.J. 729, 736-47 (1979).
53. See supra p. 1028.
54. See Hearings, supra note 11, at 819 (statement of Stanley Preiser) (costs to litigants are "sub-
stantial deterrent" and will prevent most citizens from initiating litigation to abate nuisances).
55. This assumes that the government has the will and means to enforce regulations. The current
Administration has reduced the enforcement activities of EPA. See [1981] 12 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 243.
This move has slowed the government's response to violations of current standards.
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organizations might not support the plaintiff's claim, preferring instead
the market that results in cleaner air in most areas and creates incentives
for lower emissions and better control technology.
In sum, the difficulty of bringing suit, compounded by uncertainty over
whether the common law action was preempted or weakened by equitable
doctrines, would prevent many injured landowners from litigating their
claims. The individual inequities created by the market system would go
unremedied.
C. Alternative Market Structures
Congress could attempt to modify the market scheme in a way that
would reduce the injury to individuals. For example, Congress might limit
the size of the market region, with the expectation that emission decreases
by sellers would offset increases by buyers. Such an approach, however,
would restrict the number of potential sellers, stifling market activity. A
seller must possess two characteristics: proximity to the buyer and lower
marginal abatement costs. As participants in EPA's "emission offset" pro-
gram have discovered, such a combination is rare." Even in an industrial
zone,57 with numerous emitters, such trading would be scarce. In order to
maintain clean air within the zone, each polluter would be required to
reduce emissions to a very low level. Any additional reductions would be
costly, making permits very expensive and chilling the market.
A second conceivable modification of the market structure would permit
trading, but would retain a uniform ceiling on permissible concentrations
(essentially a ceiling NAAQS). However, if the ceiling were set low
enough to prevent hot spots, it would also restrict the number of pollution
permits available to any single emitter.58
A third alternative is to expand the market area by permitting ex-
changes between distant sources at uneven rates. The seller would de-
crease its emissions more than the buyer increased its levels, so that the
seller's long-range effect on the buyer's vicinity would cancel out the hot
spot.5" However, given geographical dispersion, the rates would' have to be
56. See del Calvo y Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 401 n.147.
57. Many of the non-attainment areas qualifying for the "emission offset" program, see supra
note 21, envelop industrial zones. Even within such zones, trading has been sparse. See del Calvo y
Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 401 n.147.
58. If the polluter wanted more permits, it would have to buy from sellers located near enough to
offset its increases. The EPA's "emission offset" policy, see supra note 21, effectively creates a market
with a ceiling at the current level of pollution in the immediate vicinity of the buyer. See del Calvo y
Gonzalez, supra note 14, at 385, 399-402.
59. See R. STEWART & J. KRIER, supra note 8, at 590-92 (discussing plan to prevent localized
concentrations in water pollution market); Note, supra note 26, at 809-12. Of course, setting exchange
rates and predicting pollution flows in a river, though far from simple, see UNCERTAIN SEARCH, supra
note 12, at 16-66, 81-100, is much simpler than making the same calculations with respect to the
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very uneven. The seller's decreases would far exceed the buyer's increases.
Therefore, the control cost to the seller would be great, and the price of a
permit would again be very high.60 Furthermore, the costs of administer-
ing such a market would be high. To set an exchange rate adequate to
prevent hot spots, a complicated model of prevailing winds and topogra-
phy would be necessary.
In conclusion, modifications of the market could conceivably prevent or
diminish the severity of hot spots, but would result in high administrative
costs and a chill on trading.
IV. Compensating the Hot-Spot Victim
A preferable solution would be to provide sufficient compensation to the
victims of localized concentrations.61 Liability for damages could be estab-
lished against either the polluters (through a reform of tort doctrine)62 or
the government (through takings analysis). Like many problems involving
governmental authorization of harmful activity, the hot spot can be ana-
lyzed as either a nuisance or a taking. 3
The law of takings is preferable, for the government is a more appro-
priate source of compensation than the individual polluter. The polluter
should not bear the full brunt of compensating victims, for it is not the
atmosphere.
60. This is not to say that trades would not occur at all, but that many potential trades would be
prevented by the price (and potential efficiency gains would be lost).
61. This Note focuses on the victims who live in the area of high pollution concentration. An
economist might argue that we should compensate any persons who are injured by the operation of
the market, including the landowner whose property value declines because a nearby plant trades
away its emissions and closes down, forcing its employees (potential lessees and customers) to move
out of town. Causation becomes somewhat tenuous, however, when injuries are caused by multiple
economic forces. The same plant might have closed whether Congress had adopted a market or not.
Admittedly, secondary economic effects will also raise or lower the value of hot-spot property, but
the presence of high concentrations of pollution indicates that the market itself is causing an injury
that would not have existed legally under prescriptive regulation. In the interest of clarity and of
limiting the number of claims, the compensation procedures advocated in the Note are limited to hot-
spot victims.
Finally, as a legal (rather than economic) matter, focusing on harms caused by pollution remedies
the very injuries that the NAAQS were designed to prevent.
62. The legislatures or the courts could reform tort doctrine by (1) altering the standards of liabil-
ity, for example, adopting a strict liability standard and abolishing or reformulating the nuisance
balancing test, (2) removing impediments to standing for a class action, and (3) lowering proof re-
quirements by making all polluters in a given zone jointly liable for harms caused by pollution where
the exact source is unclear. Cf. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 85 Cal. App. 3d 1, 149 Cal. Rptr. 138
(1978) (sharing of damages under theory of enterprise liability in drug case); Summers v. Tice, 33
Cal. 2d 80, 86, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (1948) (sharing of damages between equally negligent co-defendants
where it is impossible to prove which one caused plaintiff's injury); Comment, State Air Pollution
Control Legislation, supra note 49, at 720-21; Comment, The Environmental Lawsuit, supra note 49,
at 1086-1 123.
63. Cf. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980) (authorized trespass analyzed
as taking); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979) (same); Griggs v. Allegheny County,
369 U.S. 84 (1962) (authorized private nuisance analyzed as taking); Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe,
541 F.2d 442 (4th Cir. 1976) (interference by flights analyzed as nuisance).
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sole beneficiary of the hot spot.64 The public at large benefits from less
costly pollution control translated into lower consumer prices65 and from
improved air. In particular, landowners benefit if they live next to a plant
that has sold its emission permits."6 Polluters that have reaped surplus
revenues by selling emission rights67 also profit from the creation of the
hot spot. Requiring the government to pay damages insures that these
other beneficiaries contribute through taxes toward the compensation of
the victim.
Compensation by the government would simplify hot-spot litigation.
First, such compensation avoids the difficulty of proving which emitters
have contributed to a hot spot. Furthermore, a court need not determine
whether sellers of permits have proximately caused an injury. The pres-
ence of only one defendant also avoids the multiplicity of defendants and
claims found in the typical complex environmental lawsuit. Finally, pay-
ment by the government prevents the undercompensation that would occur
if a company holding a large number of permits became insolvent and
therefore unable to pay tort claims.68
From the standpoint of fair contribution, administrative simplicity, and
certainty, compensation by the government is preferable to payments by
individual polluters.69
A. Current Takings Doctrine
A more difficult question is whether current legal principles require
payment by the government. A logical extension of current takings doc-
trine supports the view that implementation of the market and creation of
hot spots would represent a taking of property requiring just compensa-
64. Cf Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 94 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting) (beneficiaries
of air travel should contribute to purchase of local easements), discussed infra note 79.
65. See supra note 33.
66. But c. supra note 61 (landowners near seller may suffer other economic harms).
67. A firm will achieve revenues for every permit sold at a price higher than the marginal cost of
abating that amount of pollution. If the firm initially received the permit free of charge or if the resale
price is higher than the purchase price, then the firm will have a profit.
68. Note, Mass Tort Claims and the Corporate Tortfeasor: Bankruptcy Reorganization and Leg-
islative Compensation versus the Common-Law Tort System, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1297, 1300-01 (1983)
(largest asbestos manufacturer filing bankruptcy petition to stay multiple tort actions for asbestosis).
This danger seems especially great, since many firms in heavy industries (whose plants would likely
have the highest emission levels under a market system) suffer financial difficulties.
69. On the other hand, societal efficiency would be somewhat impaired, since polluters would not
internalize the costs of their externalities, and, therefore, would not estimate the potential costs of
future lawsuits when determining how many permits to buy.
Yet, the efficiency losses would not be as great as this argument suggests, for information costs
(particularly with respect to estimating lawsuits) would undermine the polluter's ability to plan. In
addition, present liability rules greatly weaken the ability of plaintiffs to force polluters to internalize
their costs.
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tion.70 The government takes property when it transfers the right to "use
or burden property in a particular way . . . from the original owner to
another person.171 In particular, a taking occurs when the government
grants an easement over one person's property to third parties. 2 In the
present case, the government program would create an air easement over
the hot spot victim's land. In Griggs v. Allegheny County,7 the Supreme
Court held that a county had taken an air easement over plaintiff's prop-
erty by creating an airplane glide path through his superadjacent airspace.
Similarly, in the case of a hot spot, the landowner would lose control of an
easement through his superadjacent air. The government would transfer
control of that easement to a limited market that would allocate pollution
without regard to the landowner's interest.
Current case law may not recognize the hot spot as a taking, because
pollution may not be a sufficient invasion of plaintiff's airspace. The
Tenth Circuit held, in Batten v. United States,74 that localized smoke
from an airport was not a sufficient invasion of property to constitute a
taking. However, the court expressly distinguished Richards v. Washing-
ton Terminal,75 in which the Supreme Court held that a taking existed
because plaintiff suffered a greater burden than other citizens and because
the defendant channeled smoke and fumes across plaintiff's property. The
hot-spot victim likewise would suffer an abnormal burden, and the market
would represent a federal scheme allocating emission rights to particular
sources, thereby channeling society's pollutants through specified ease-
ments to reach a general pool of ambient air. 6
It is true, of course, that private firms rather than government officials
would determine the location of hot spots. The Supreme Court, however,
recently held that a taking exists where market parties (acting pursuant to
government authorization) determine the location of easements.7 7 Further-
more, the private trades would serve a particular governmental function:
70. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
71. South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 679 (1st Cir. 1974).
72. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 433-38 (1982); Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
73. 369 U.S. 84 (1982).
74. 306 F.2d 580, 583-85 (10th Cir. 1962).
75. 233 U.S. 546 (1914); see Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d at 584.
76. In recent years, a number of state courts have held that pollution entering plaintiffs property
represents a sufficient "physical invasion" to create a trespass. See, e.g., Renken v. Harvey Alumi-
num, 226 F. Supp. 169 (D. Or. 1963); Fairview Farms v. Reynolds Metals, 176 F. Supp. 178 (D.
Or. 1959); Borland v. Sanders Lead, 369 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1979); Roberts v. Permanente Corp., 188
Cal. App. 2d 526, 10 Cal. Rptr. 519 (1961); Martin v. Reynolds Metals, 221 Or. 86, 342 P.2d 790
(1959), cert. denied, 362 U.S. 918 (1960). The same logic would support viewing pollution as an
invasion for the purposes of takings law.
77. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (cable television
company determined location of cable easement).
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the allocation of pollution controls at lowest cost. The government would
still find itself closely associated with the allocation process. The market
would operate in the context of a federal scheme that set overall levels,
distributed permits, established rules for trading, monitored emissions, and
perhaps even encouraged trading."' Such extensive governmental partici-
pation indicates that the hot spot is not an ordinary nuisance, but is rather
the authorized result of a comprehensive program.79
B. Compensation Under Current Doctrine
The hot spot is a taking for which compensation should be paid. Under
current doctrine, not every taking of property requires monetary compen-
sation.80 Although the Supreme Court has yet to develop a clear formula
for determining when compensation is due,' the Court has identified a
number of relevant factors: the economic impact of the governmental ac-
tion, the extent to which the action has interfered with reasonable invest-
ment-backed expectations, and the character of the action. 2
The last factor is particularly important. The Court has more readily
found a compensable taking when the governmental action "will result in
an actual physical invasion" of private property."3 The Court has adopted
this position in an air easement case8' and in a case in which the govern-
ment granted an easement to third parties.8 5 Such a doctrine reflects the
common judicial view that an owner suffers "a special kind of injury"
when his property is invaded." As discussed above, the focused concentra-
78. See supra p. 1028 (government may actively promote trades to "grease the wheels" of a pollu-
tion market).
79. Similarly, in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962), the county was held liable
for damages actually caused by private airlines following an authorized glide path. To be sure, Griggs
represents a stronger case of governmental action, since the county actually chose the location of its
runways. Justices Black and Frankfurter, however, argued in dissent that the federal government
should be held liable for setting up a comprehensive program that authorized counties to build air-
ports and take easements. Id. at 94 (Black, J., joined by Frankfurter, J., dissenting). They stressed the
point that because the whole nation benefited from the federal scheme, the individual county should
not have to bear an unfair proportion of the costs of easements. Id. The logic of sharing proportional
costs is likewise strong where the federal scheme affects the allocation of a public good: clean air.
80. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980); Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
81. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982); Kai-
ser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 175 (1979); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978).
82. See, e.g., Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426; PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 83.
83. Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433 (quoting Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 180) (emphasis omitted).
84. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265-66 (1946). The Causby Court distinguished
Richards v. Washington Terminal, 233 U.S. 546 (1914), referring to that portion of Richards in
which compensation was denied for damages due to incidental smoke. 328 U.S. at 262. The hot spot,
however, closely resembles the invasion by channeled pollutants, which was held to be compensable in
Richards.
85. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 180 (1979).
86. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 436 (1982).
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tion of pollutants in a hot spot represents a sufficient physical intrusion to
view it as an invasion of the landowner's property.8"
In addition, the hot-spot victim has been injured due to reasonable in-
vestment-backed expectations. His investment in property and continued
uses88 of it have reflected his expectation that the government would not
allow pollution to exceed safe levels. The Court, in Kaiser Aetna v.
United States,89 placed great weight on expectations developed in reliance
upon a governmental promise. The strong commitment in the Clean Air
Act to uniform protection of health90 would engender clear expectations of
minimal air quality.
Above all, the Supreme Court has noted that the basic issue underlying
the compensation clause is whether the interference "'forc[es] some people
alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be
borne by the public as a whole.' "91 Given the move from a strictly equita-
ble system to one that singles out a few individuals to suffer for the benefit
of the general public, compensation is especially appropriate.9 2 In sum,
takings doctrine would require that the government compensate victims of
hot spots.
C. Baseline for Compensation
The NAAQS developed pursuant to the Clean Air Act form an appro-
priate baseline against which to measure a taking. They establish a na-
tional, uniform status quo. Based on pollutants' effects on persons and
land, NAAQS effectively set the outer limits on one characteristic of real
87. See supra p. 1034.
It could be argued that the concentration of pollutants is a "permanent" invasion, giving rise to a
taking per se. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426-35. By permanent, the Loretto Court meant that the
intrusion is continuous, not that it is of infinite duration. Thus, the installation of a television cable
was deemed permanent. Id. at 437-39.
A hot spot might be considered permanent because it is a continuous concentration. On the other
hand, a court might hold that the hot spot more closely resembled the non-permanent easement in
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), because each invader (each particle of pollution)
moved through the property. See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 433 (discussing Kaiser Aetna). In any event,
even if a hot spot were not considered a permanent intrusion, it would still be subject to the strict
standards that apply to any actual invasion.
88. High levels of pollution will interfere directly with the landowner's ability to maintain current
uses of his land, thus distinguishing this case from Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S.
104, 136 (1978), where a challenged regulation prevented only anticipated uses (unsupported by any
actual investment). Also, in Penn Central, the regulation caused no physical invasion of plaintiff's
property. Id. at 135.
89. 444 U.S. 164, 179 (1979).
90. See supra p. 1023.
91. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 83 (1980) (quoting Armstrong v. United
States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960)).
92. This "equality" component of the takings clause distinguishes the hot-spot problem from the
situation in which the government merely relaxes NAAQS. In the latter case, expectations are dashed,
but the change does not force a few individuals to bear special burdens to benefit the rest of society.
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property in the United States. Moreover, they set a standard of protection
from physical invasion. Any violation of that standard implicates the val-
ues seen by the courts as most clearly protected by the takings clause:
security in the status quo and protection against government-authorized
invasions of land.
The Clean Air Act is unique in setting national standards that regulate
physical invasions and that are based on the impact of pollutants on per-
sons and land. Therefore, the institution of a pollution market creating
hot spots would be distinguishable from most other changes in govern-
mental programs (such as zoning changes or elimination of entitlements).
Because the courts have drawn a line between actual invasions of property
and mere economic pressures, the hot spot would involve a compensable
taking of property whereas most other governmental actions would not.9 3
D. Statutory Liability
As the preceding sections show, hot spot victims would have a constitu-
tional cause of action against the government entity that established the
market. Congress, nevertheless, should create an explicit cause of action to
be heard in an administrative tribunal. 4 Such a statute could eliminate
some of the pitfalls that victims might face if they had to rely on the
courts to recognize an unconstitutional taking. For example, the statute
would clarify the victim's right to compensation;95 otherwise some courts
93. The hot spot is also distinguishable from a modification of NAAQS, because the hot spot
involves a particularized interference. Although raising NAAQS would increase the potential inva-
sions of airspace, the burden would be shared by all citizens. Since takings doctrine focuses on individ-
ual burdens, a generalized interference is not a taking.
Even if pollution levels did not rise in every region to the new ceiling permitted by the amended
NAAQS, one region would not automatically carry a burden for the rest of society. The market hot
spot would ensure cleaner air in other regions.
Finally, the mere alteration of NAAQS would not undermine the basic purpose of the Clean Air
Act: to maintain breathable air in all regions. In contrast, the creation of a market theoretically per-
mitting all the pollutants in an AQCR to be focused in one locality would abandon both the Act's
equitable purpose and the notion of maintaining breathable air. Some regions could be unsafe, unless
the total number of pollutants in the AQCR were set so low that a complete concentration (resulting
from the ownership of all permits by one polluter) would not exceed the levels considered safe by the
EPA.
In sum, the market hot spot is a more individualized burden and, therefore, violates the takings
clause whereas a mere increase in NAAQS does not.
94. Admittedly, such a system might not be perfectly efficient, for example, if the landowner
received greater compensation than he would have accepted through negotiation with the polluter. Cf.
Calabresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathe-
dral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1118 (1972) (efficiency achieved through bargaining between polluter
and "pollutee"). It may be justified, however, to trade off some efficiency in order to provide a more
certain remedy and to ensure that all the beneficiaries of the market contribute to compensation
payments.
95. Congress would base its statute on the victim's constitutional right to compensation. The con-
clusions of takings analysis are binding on the legislative and executive branches as well as the courts.
Indeed, the legislature and executive agencies often draft statutes or regulations concerning compensa-
tion procedures. See, e.g., Declaration of Taking Act, 40 U.S.C. §§ 258a-c (1976) (procedures for
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might be less than eager to recognize this justification for an award.
As a policy matter, providing an explicit compensation scheme might
also expedite the creation of the market. Legislators, suspicious of the
market concept, would be less worried and less opposed if they felt that
victims were certain to receive compensation.
Finally, statutory treatment permits Congress to tailor jurisdictional re-
quirements and standards of liability carefully. Assuming that federal leg-
islation or regulation authorized the market scheme, the compensation
statute would require the federal government to compensate landowners
and residents96 for damages resulting from a hot spot sanctioned by that
market. The statute would create a special administrative hearing board' 7
and give it jurisdiction to hear claims and assess damages. As a first hur-
dle, a plaintiff would have to show that pollution levels in his super-
adjacent airspace after a trade or after the initial distribution of permits
were higher than would have been permissible under primary NAAQS.98
transfer of land amount to a taking); Federal Highway Administration, Acquisition Function, 23
C.F.R. §§ 712.101-712.805 (1983) (taking of lands for highway projects). Thus, the same theory that
informs judicial determinations of compensation could likewise guide the legislature in creating a
statutory claim for compensation.
96. Residents (such as lessees) as well as landowners are protected by the takings clause. See, e.g.,
United States v. Right to Use and Occupy 3.38 Acres of Land, 484 F.2d 1140 (4th Cir. 1973)
(lessee's right to compensation for loss of leasehold); Pekofsky v. State, 15 Misc. 2d 358, 180 N.Y.S.2d
930 (Ct. CI. 1958) (same).
Arguably, other persons, such as employees who spend considerable time in a region, also deserve
compensation. They may be as bound to a region by economic necessity as residents are bound by
investment. The compensation statute could, in theory, be modified to include such persons. The ad-
ministrative costs of separating worthy beneficiaries from unworthy ones, however, would be great.
Determinations of the relevant locale for measuring concentrations would require complicated fact-
finding and subtle distinctions, compounding the difficulty of proving causation of injuries.
Using property ownership and residency as criteria might also allow some unworthy parties to
bring actions. Those criteria, however, would at least provide a clear definition of the locale for mea-
suring a concentration and some assurance that the plaintiffs had suffered hot-spot related injuries.
Even absentee property owners would suffer from diminution in real estate value.
Furthermore, focusing on the injuries of property owners and residents vindicates the central con-
cern of takings doctrine: protecting the individual against invasions of property.
97. Creating a special hearing board to hear claims would have a number of advantages over
using the federal courts. First, the board could develop expertise in the field of air pollution injuries.
Second, the courts, already confronted with heavy caseloads, would not have the additional burden of
hearing pollution market compensation claims.
Non-judicial officers often make the first assessment of damages in just compensation cases. See,
e.g., Real Estate Activities of the Corps of Enginecers in Connection with Civil Works Projects, 33
C.F.R. § 211.4(b)(2) (1983) (Corps making initial assessment of just compensation and depositing
bond with court); FED. R. CIV. P. 71A(h) (court-appointed commissioners determining compensa-
tion). Moreover, rule 71A recognizes the power of Congress to constitute a tribunal for the determina-
tion of just compensation issues.
98. Choosing primary rather than secondary NAAQS as the baseline for liability ensures that
injuries to health (as well as welfare) are related to the violation of former national standards. Fur-
thermore, the choice avoids the difficulty of deciding what would have been a "reasonable time" for
compliance with secondary NAAQS. See supra note 8.
Even if the original distribution merely ratified former violations of the NAAQS program, a taking
would theoretically occur because now those excesses would be authorized by law. There might be no
damage to property, however, since pollution levels had not changed and driven property values down.
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Damages would be determined by the difference between the market
value of plaintiff's land before and after the trade, plus any health-related
damages"9 incurred by plaintiff as a result of the high pollution concentra-
tions.100 (Of course, it may be difficult for plaintiff to quantify or mone-
tize health damages, or to prove that they were caused by pollution.10 1)
The statute would also assign burdens of proof. The diminution in
property value after a trade would create a presumption that the loss was
due to the development of the hot spot. The government, however, could
rebut the presumption by showing that part (or all) of the loss was attrib-
utable to other causes.
On the other hand, a stable or rising property value would create a
presumption that the hot spot had caused no injury. The burden would
then be on the plaintiff to show that his property value was not as high as
it would have been but for the existence of the hot spot. l02
The federal government would be liable for any damages the board
assessed. The governmental defendant could, of course, adopt a policy that
ensured "contribution" from polluters in the relevant market region. For
example, if the government started the market by assigning property
rights on the basis of former SIP requirements,1 03 it might demand contri-
bution for future harms by assessing a one-time property tax on emission
rights and thereby creating a pool from which to pay plaintiffs. If the
99. Courts often require the government to pay for damages incidental to a taking of property.
See United States v. 9.20 Acres of Land, 638 F.2d 1123, 1126-27 (8th Cir. 1981) (injury to other land
compensable); United States v. 339.77 Acres of Land, 240 F. Supp. 545, 549 (W.D. Ark. 1965)
(injury to equipment compensable).
Furthermore, if the government had compensated the landowners ex ante for the taking of the
easement, anticipated personal injuries would have constituted an element affecting the value of prop-
erty. See United States ex rel. TVA v. Two Strips of Land in Trigg County, 249 F. Supp. 747 (W.D.
Ky. 1966) (court could consider expected injuries to health). Awarding damages for personal injuries
would theoretically correct for the time lag between an ex ante and ex post evaluation. To include
health damages is not "double-counting," for the current market value of the property reflects only
future injuries to health, not injuries already suffered by the plaintiff.
100. In order to prevent multiple frivolous claims and limit process costs, the board would require
that a plaintiff prove substantial damages, not just a slight diminution of the value of his property.
101. First, the plaintiff may have difficulty in proving the extent and monetary value of injuries to
health. However, it should at least be possible to prove the expenses incurred in treating a medical
disability, and the tribunal could retain jurisdiction over a case in order to award payment for ex-
penses incurred after the initial hearing. Furthermore, though valuation of pain and suffering would
be somewhat speculative, courts have traditionally assessed such damages.
The plaintiff may also have difficulty in proving that pollution rather than other influences (such as
smoking) caused his injury. See supra note 52. Lawyers and commentators have attempted to develop
techniques for making this proof. See Note, supra note 52, at 857 (use of statistical probabilities to
create presumption that cancer caused by pollution); cf Industrial Union v. American Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 636 n.41 (1980) (offer of statistical evidence during OSHA rulemaking on ben-
zene standard); Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in LAW AND THE ENVIRON-
MENT 105, 107, 117-20 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970) (suggesting that burden of proof be
lowered). In general, however, the courts have yet to adopt these changes.
102. In either case, the plaintiff would have the burden of proving health-related damages.
103. The "emission offset" program, for example, starts from a baseline determined by SIPs. See
supra note 21.
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market commenced with a general auction, 0 the government might simi-
larly pay damages out of the proceeds from the auction. Neither approach
would harm the internal efficiency of the pollution rights market. The
relative costs of control technology would still induce polluters to trade
emissions and reach an optimal mix. Moreover, this tax would be "fair"
in that other beneficiaries of the market would still contribute, since the
government would pay only part of the damages out of the pollution tax
pool, paying the rest out of general tax revenues.
Naturally, if the government wanted to create incentives to avoid hot
spots, it might tax the polluters who bought emission permits more heav-
ily than other members of the market. This could be achieved by putting a
tax on the emissions transfer or by taxing emission rights every year. Such
a decision, however, would sacrifice the internal efficiency of the market
for the sake of more consistent air quality.
Conclusion
The creation of a market in pollution rights would pose a significant
risk of localized injuries that the government could mitigate by providing
compensation to individual victims. Takings doctrine provides a constitu-
tional basis for compensation, and Congress should recognize the obliga-
tion by creating an explicit statutory cause of action in an administrative
tribunal.
104. See supra note 23.
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